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Abstract
We initiate the study of two-party cryptographic primitives with
unconditional security, assuming that the adversary’s quantum mem-
ory is of bounded size. We show that oblivious transfer and bit com-
mitment can be implemented in this model using protocols where hon-
est parties need no quantum memory, whereas an adversarial player
needs quantum memory of size at least n/2 in order to break the pro-
tocol, where n is the number of qubits transmitted. This is in sharp
contrast to the classical bounded-memory model, where we can only
tolerate adversaries with memory of size quadratic in honest players’
memory size. Our protocols are efficient, non-interactive and can be
implemented using today’s technology. On the technical side, a new
entropic uncertainty relation involving min-entropy is established.
1 Introduction
It is well known that non-trivial 2-party cryptographic primitives cannot
be securely implemented if only error-free communication is available and
there is no limitation assumed on the computing power and memory of
the players. Fundamental examples of such primitives are bit commitment
(BC) and oblivious transfer (OT). In BC, a committer C commits himself to
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a choice of a bit b by exchanging information with a verifier V. We want that
V does not learn b (we say the commitment is hiding), yet C can later chose
to reveal b in a convincing way, i.e., only the value fixed at commitment time
will be accepted by V (we say the commitment is binding). In (Rabin) OT,
a sender S sends a bit b to a receiver R by executing some protocol in such
a way that R receives b with probability 12 and nothing with probability
1
2 ,
yet S does not learn what was received.
Informally, BC is not possible with unconditional security since hiding
means that when 0 is committed, exactly the same information exchange
could have happened when committing to a 1. Hence, even if 0 was actually
committed to, C could always compute a complete view of the protocol
consistent with having committed to 1, and pretend that this was what he
had in mind originally. A similar type of argument shows that OT is also
impossible in this setting.
One might hope that allowing the protocol to make use of quantum com-
munication would make a difference. Here, information is stored in qubits,
i.e., in the state of two-level quantum mechanical systems, such as the polar-
ization state of a single photon. It is well known that quantum information
behaves in a way that is fundamentally different from classical information,
enabling, for instance, unconditionally secure key exchange between two
honest players. However, in the case of two mutually distrusting parties, we
are not so fortunate: even with quantum communication, unconditionally
secure BC and OT remain impossible [18, 21].
There are, however, several scenarios where these impossibility results
do not apply, namely:
• if the computing power of players is bounded,
• if the communication is noisy,
• if the adversary is under some physical limitation, e.g., the size of the
available memory is bounded.
The first scenario is the basis of many well known solutions based on
plausible but unproven complexity assumptions, such as hardness of factor-
ing or discrete logarithms. The second scenario has been used to construct
both BC and OT protocols in various models for the noise [6, 8, 11]. The
third scenario is our focus here. In this model, OT and BC can be done
using classical communication assuming, however, quite restrictive bounds
on the adversary’s memory size [3, 12], namely it can be at most quadratic
in the memory size of honest players. Such an assumption is on the edge of
being realistic, it would clearly be more satisfactory to have a larger sepa-
ration between the memory size of honest players and that of the adversary.
However, this was shown to be impossible [15].
In this paper, we study for the first time what happens if instead we
consider protocols where quantum communication is used and we place a
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bound on the adversary’s quantum memory size. There are two reasons
why this may be a good idea: first, if we do not bound the classical memory
size, we avoid the impossibility result of [15]. Second, the adversary’s typical
goal is to obtain a certain piece of classical information that we want to keep
hidden from him. However, if he cannot store all the quantum information
that is sent, he must convert some of it to classical information by measuring.
This may irreversibly destroy information, and we may be able to arrange
it such that the adversary cannot afford to lose information this way, while
honest players can.
It turns out that this is indeed possible: we present protocols for both
BC and OT in which n qubits are transmitted, where honest players need no
quantum memory, but where the adversary must store at least n/2 qubits
to break the protocol. We emphasize that no bound is assumed on the
adversary’s computing power, nor on his classical memory. This is clearly
much more satisfactory than the classical case, not only from a theoretical
point of view, but also in practice: while sending qubits and measuring
them immediately as they arrive is well within reach of current technology,
storing even a single qubit for more than a fraction of a second is a formidable
technological challenge. Furthermore, we show that our protocols also work
in a non-ideal setting where we allow the quantum source to be imperfect
and the quantum communication to be noisy.
We emphasize that what makes OT and BC possible in our model is
not so much the memory bound per se, rather it is the loss of information
it implies on the part of the adversary. Indeed, our results also hold if
the adversary’s memory device holds an arbitrary number of qubits, but is
imperfect is certain ways. This is discussed in more detail in Section 5.
Our protocols are non-interactive, only one party sends information when
doing OT, commitment or opening. Furthermore, the commitment protocol
has the interesting property that the only message is sent to the commit-
ter, i.e., it is possible to commit while only receiving information. Such a
scheme clearly does not exist without a bound on the committer’s memory,
even under computational assumptions and using quantum communication:
a corrupt committer could always store (possibly quantumly) all the infor-
mation sent, until opening time, and only then follow the honest committer’s
algorithm to figure out what should be sent to convincingly open a 0 or a 1.
Note that in the classical bounded-storage model, it is known how to do
time-stamping that is non-interactive in our sense: a player can time-stamp
a document while only receiving information [22]. However, no reasonable
BC or protocol that time-stamps a bit exist in this model. It is straight-
forward to see that any such protocol can be broken by an adversary with
classical memory of size twice that of an honest player, while our proto-
col requires no memory for the honest players and remains secure against
any adversary not able to store more than half the size of the quantum
transmission.
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We also note that it has been shown earlier that BC is possible using
quantum communication, assuming a different type of physical limitation,
namely a bound on the size of coherent measurement that can be imple-
mented [25]. This limitation is incomparable to ours: it does not limit the
total size of the memory, instead it limits the number of bits that can be
simultaneously operated on to produce a classical result. Our adversary
has a limit on the total memory size, but can measure all of it coherently.
The protocol from [25] is interactive, and requires a bound on the maximal
measurement size that is sub-linear in n.
On the technical side, we derive a new type of uncertainty relation in-
volving the min-entropy of a quantum encoding (Theorem 3.7 and Corol-
lary 3.8). The relation is in a suitable form to apply privacy amplification
against quantum adversaries as introduced by Renner and Ko¨nig [23].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
For a set I = {i1, i2, . . . , iℓ} ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and a n-bit string x ∈ {0, 1}n,
we define x|I := xi1xi2 · · · xiℓ . For x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, x · y ∈ {0, 1} denotes the
(standard) in-product of x and y. For a probability distribution Q over n-
bit strings and a set L ⊆ {0, 1}n, we abbreviate the (overall) probability of
L with Q(L) :=
∑
x∈LQ(x). All logarithms in this paper are to base two.
We denote by h(p) the binary entropy function h(p) := −(p · log p + (1 −
p) · log (1− p)). We denote by negl(n) any function of n smaller than any
polynomial provided n is sufficiently large. For x ∈ {0, 1}n, we write Bδn(x)
for the set of all n-bit strings at Hamming distance at most δn from x. Note
that the number of elements in Bδn(x) is the same for all x, we denote it by
Bδn := |Bδn(x)|. It is well known that Bδn ≤ 2nh(δ).
The pair {|0〉, |1〉} denotes the computational or rectilinear or “+” basis
for the 2-dimensional complex Hilbert space C2. The diagonal or “×” basis
is defined as {|0〉×, |1〉×} where |0〉× = 1√2(|0〉+|1〉) and |1〉× =
1√
2
(|0〉−|1〉).
Measuring a qubit in the + -basis (resp. ×-basis) means applying the mea-
surement described by projectors |0〉〈0| and |1〉〈1| (resp. projectors |0〉×〈0|×
and |1〉×〈1|×). When the context requires it, we write |0〉+ and |1〉+ instead
of |0〉 respectively |1〉; and for any x ∈ {0, 1}n and r ∈ {+,×}, we write
|x〉r =
⊗n
i=1 |xi〉r. If we want to choose the + or ×-basis according to the
bit b ∈ {0, 1}, we write {+,×}[b].
2.2 Quantum Probability Theory
As basis for the security definitions and proofs of our protocols, we are
using the formalism introduced in [23], which we briefly summarize here.
A random state ρ is a random variable, with distribution Pρ, whose range
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is the set of density operators of a fixed Hilbert space. The view of an
observer (which is ignorant of the value of ρ) is given by the quantum
system described by the density operator [ρ] :=
∑
ρ Pρ(ρ)ρ. In general, for
any event E , we define [ρ|E ] := ∑ρ Pρ|E(ρ)ρ. If ρ is dependent on some
classical random variable X, with joint distribution PXρ, we also write ρx
instead of [ρ|X = x]. Note that ρx is a density operator (for any fixed x)
whereas ρX is again a random state. The overall quantum system is then
given by [{X} ⊗ ρ] = ∑x PX(x) {x} ⊗ ρx, where {x} := |x〉〈x| is the state
representation of x and {X} the corresponding random state. Obviously,
[{X} ⊗ ρ] = [{X}] ⊗ [ρ] if and only if ρX is independent of X, where the
latter in particular implies that no information on X can be learned by
observing only ρ. Furthermore, if [{X} ⊗ ρ] and [{X}] ⊗ [ρ] are ε-close in
terms of their trace distance δ(ρ, σ) = 12 tr(|ρ − σ|), then the real system
[{X}⊗ρ] “behaves” as the ideal system [{X}]⊗ [ρ] except with probability
ε [23] in that for any evolution of the system no observer can distinguish the
real from the ideal one with advantage greater than ε. Henceforth, we use
unif to denote a random variable with range {0, 1}, uniformly distributed
and independent of anything else, and, as in [23], we use d(X|ρ) as a short
hand for δ
(
[{X} ⊗ ρ], [{unif}]⊗ [ρ]).
We consider the notion of the classical Re´nyi entropy Hα(X) of order
α of a random variable X [24], as well as its generalization to the Re´nyi
entropy Sα(ρ) of a state ρ [23]. It holds that Sα([{X}]) = Hα(X) and
Sα([{X}]) ≤ Sβ([{X}]) if α ≥ β. The cases that are relevant for us are
the classical min-entropy H∞(X) = − log (maxx PX(x)) as well as the max
and the collision Von Neumann entropy S0(ρ) = log (rank(ρ)) respectively
S2(ρ) = − log
(∑
i λ
2
i
)
, where {λi}i are the eigenvalues of ρ.
2.3 Bounded Quantum Storage and Privacy Amplification
All our protocols take place in the bounded quantum-storage model, which
concretely means the following: the state of an adversarial player may con-
sist of an arbitrary number of qubits, and he may perform arbitrary quantum
computation. At a certain point in time though, we say that the memory
bound applies, which means that all but q of the qubits are measured. Af-
ter this point, the player is again unbounded in (quantum) memory and
computing power. We note that our results also apply to some cases where
the adversary’s memory is not bounded but is noisy in certain ways, see
Section 5.
An important tool we will use is universal hashing. A class Hn of hashing
functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1} is called two-universal if for any pair x, y ∈
{0, 1}n with x 6= y
∣∣{f ∈ Hn : f(x) = f(y)}∣∣ ≤ |Hn|
2
.
5
Several two-universal classes of hashing functions are such that evaluating
and picking a function uniformly and at random in Hn can be done efficiently
[4, 27].
Theorem 2.1 ([23]). Let X be distributed over {0, 1}n, and let ρ be a
random state of q qubits1. Let F be the random variable corresponding
to the random choice (with uniform distribution and independent from X
and ρ) of a member of a two-universal class of hashing functions Hn. Then
d([F (X)|{F} ⊗ ρ]) ≤ 1
2
2−
1
2
(S2([{X}⊗ρ])−S0([ρ])−1) (1)
≤ 1
2
2−
1
2
(H∞(X)−q−1). (2)
The first inequality (1) is the original theorem from [23], and (2) follows
by observing that S2([{X} ⊗ ρ]) ≥ S2([{X}]) = H2(X) ≥ H∞(X). In this
paper, we essentially only use this weaker version of the theorem.
Note that if the rightmost term of (2) is negligible, i.e. say smaller than
2−εn, then this situation is 2−εn-close to the ideal situation where F (X) is
perfectly uniform and independent of ρ and F . In particular, the situations
F (X) = 0 and F (X) = 1 are statistically indistinguishable given ρ and
F [17].
The following lemma is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.1. In Sec-
tion 4, this lemma will be useful for proving the binding condition of our com-
mitment scheme. Recall that for X ∈ {0, 1}n, Bδn(X) denotes the set of all
n-bit strings at Hamming distance at most δn from X and Bδn := |Bδn(X)|
is the number of such strings.
Lemma 2.2. Let X be distributed over {0, 1}n, let ρ be a random state of
q qubits and let Xˆ be a guess for X given ρ. Then, for all δ < 12 it holds
that
Pr
[
Xˆ ∈ Bδn(X)] ≤ 2− 12 (H∞(X)−q−1)+log(Bδn).
In other words, given a quantum memory of q qubits arbitrarily correlated
with a classical random variable X, the probability to find Xˆ at Hamming
distance at most δn from X where nh(δ) < 12(H∞(X)− q) is negligible.
Proof: Here is a strategy to try to bias F (X) when given Xˆ and F ∈R Hn:
Sample X ′ ∈R Bδn(Xˆ) and output F (X ′). Note that, using psucc as a short
hand for the probability Pr
[
Xˆ ∈ Bδn(X)] to be bounded,
Pr
[
F (X ′) = F (X)
]
=
psucc
Bδn
+
(
1− psucc
Bδn
)
1
2
1Remember that ρ can be correlated with X in an arbitrary way. In particular, we can
think of ρ as an attempt to store the n-bit string X in q qubits.
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=
1
2
+
psucc
2 ·Bδn ,
where the first equality follows from the fact that if X ′ 6= X then, as Hn
is two-universal, Pr [F (X) = F (X ′)] = 12 . Since the probability of correctly
guessing a binary F (X) given F and ρ is always upper bounded by 12 +
d(F (X)|{F} ⊗ ρ), in combination with Theorem 2.1 the above results in
1
2
+
psucc
2 · Bδn ≤
1
2
+
1
2
2−
1
2
(H∞(X)−q−1)
and the claim follows immediately. 
3 Rabin Oblivious Transfer
3.1 The Definition
A protocol for Rabin Oblivious Transfer (ROT) between sender Alice and
receiver Bob allows for Alice to send a bit b through an erasure channel
to Bob. Each transmission delivers b or an erasure with probability 12 .
Intuitively, a protocol for ROT is secure if
• the sender Alice gets no information on whether b was received or not,
no matter what she does, and
• the receiver Bob gets no information about b with probability at least 12 ,
no matter what he does.
In this paper, we are considering quantum protocols for ROT. This means
that while the inputs and outputs of the honest senders are classical, de-
scribed by random variables, the protocol may contain quantum computa-
tion and quantum communication, and the view of a dishonest player is
quantum, and is thus described by a random state.
Any such (two-party) protocol is specified by a family {(Sn,Rn)}n>0 of
pairs of interactive quantum circuits (i.e. interacting through a quantum
channel). Each pair is indexed by a security parameter n > 0, where Sn
and Rn denote the circuits for sender Alice and receiver Bob, respectively.
In order to simplify the notation, we often omit the index n, leaving the
dependency on it implicit.
For the formal definition of the security requirements of a ROT protocol,
let us fix the following notation. Let B denote the binary random variable
describing S’s input bit b, and let A and B′ denote the binary random vari-
ables describing R’s two output bits, where the meaning is that A indicates
whether the bit was received or not. Furthermore, for a dishonest sender
S˜ (respectively R˜) let ρ
S˜
(ρ
R˜
) denote the random state describing S˜’s (R˜’s)
view of the protocol. Note that for a fixed candidate protocol for ROT,
and for a fixed input distribution PB , depending on whether we consider
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two honest S and R, a dishonest S˜ and an honest R, or an honest S and a
dishonest R˜, the corresponding joint distribution PBAB′ , Pρ
S˜
AB′ respectively
PBρ
R˜
is uniquely determined.
Definition 3.1. A two-party (quantum) protocol (S,R) is a (statistically)
secure ROT if the following holds.
Correctness: For honest S and R
Pr [B = B′|A = 1] ≥ 1− negl(n) .
Receiver-Privacy: For any S˜
d(A|ρ
S˜
) ≤ negl(n) .
Sender-Privacy: For any R˜ there exists an event E with P [E ] ≥ 12−negl(n)
such that
δ([B ⊗ ρ
R˜
|E ], [B]⊗ [ρ
R˜
|E ]) ≤ negl(n) .
If any of the above trace distances equals 0, then the corresponding property
is said to hold perfectly. If one of the properties only holds with respect
to a restricted class S of S˜’s respectively R of R˜’s, then this property is said
to hold and the protocol is said to be secure against S respectively R.
Receiver-privacy requires that the joint quantum state is essentially the
same as when A is uniformly distributed and independent of the sender’s
view, and sender-privacy requires that there exists some event which occurs
with probability at least 12 (the event that the receiver does not receive the
bit) and under which the joint quantum state is essentially the same as when
B is distributed (according to PB) independently of the receiver’s view.
We warn the reader that the above definition does not guarantee that
the ROT protocol is equivalent to an “ideal black-box implementation” of
ROT, so it does not guarantee universal composability, for instance. One
main reason for this is that, unlike the classical case [7], receiver-privacy
as we define it does not guarantee that the input bit b is determined after
the execution of ROT. In other words, S˜ is not necessarily bound to her
input. In fact, this is not surprising, since our model places no limitations
whatsoever on the sender. If S˜ was indeed bound to her input, a straight-
forward reduction would allow us to build from ROT a statistically hiding
commitment scheme where the ROT sender is the committer. But since
the sender is unbounded, she can always break the binding property using
essentially the standard attack against unconditionally secure quantum bit
commitment [18, 21].
A more rigorous definition of Oblivious Transfer is therefore required
in order to allow for composability. Moreover, we see from the above that
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satisfying such a definition will require some limitation to be placed on the
sender, such as a memory bound. This would, for instance, allow using the
commitment scheme we present later in this paper with the ROT sender in
the role of committer. These issue will be further addressed in a forthcoming
paper [9].
3.2 The Protocol
We introduce a quantum protocol for ROT that will be shown perfectly
receiver-private (against any sender) and statistically sender-private against
any quantum memory-bounded receiver. Our protocol exhibits some simi-
larity with quantum conjugate coding introduced by Wiesner [28].
The protocol is very simple (see Figure 1): S picks x ∈R {0, 1}n and sends
to R n qubits in state either |x〉+ or |x〉× each chosen with probability 12 . R
then measures all received qubits either in the rectilinear or in the diagonal
basis. With probability 12 , R picked the right basis and gets x, while any R˜
that is forced to measure part of the state (due to a memory bound) can
only have full information on x in case the +-basis was used or in case the ×-
basis was used (but not in both cases). Privacy amplification based on any
two-universal class of hashing functions Hn is then used to destroy partial
information. (In order to avoid aborting, we specify that if a dishonest S˜
refuses to participate, or sends data in incorrect format, then R samples its
output bits a and b′ both at random in {0, 1}.)
qot(b):
1. S picks x ∈R {0, 1}n, and r ∈R {+,×}.
2. S sends |ψ〉 := |x〉r to R (i.e. the string x in basis r).
3. R picks r′ ∈R {+,×} and measures all qubits of |ψ〉 in basis r′.
Let x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
4. S announces r, f ∈R Hn, and e := b⊕ f(x).
5. R outputs a := 1 and b′ := e ⊕ f(x′) if r′ = r and else a := 0 and
b′ := 0.
Figure 1. Protocol for Rabin QOT
As we shall see in Section 3.5, the security of the qot protocol against
receivers with bounded-size quantum memory holds as long as the bound
applies before Step 4 is reached. An equivalent protocol is obtained by
purifying the sender’s actions. Although qot is easy to implement, the
purified or EPR-based version [16] depicted in Figure 2 is easier to prove
secure. A similar approach was taken in the Shor-Preskill proof of security
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for the BB84 quantum key distribution scheme [26].
epr-qot(b):
1. S prepares n EPR pairs each in state |Ω〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉).
2. S sends one half of each pair to R and keeps the other halves.
3. R picks r′ ∈R {+,×} and measures all received qubits in basis r′.
Let x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
4. S picks r ∈R {+,×}, and measures all kept qubits in basis r.
Let x ∈ {0, 1}n be the outcome. S announces r, f ∈R Hn, and
e := b⊕ f(x).
5. R outputs a := 1 and b′ := e ⊕ f(x′) if r′ = r and else a := 0 and
b′ := 0.
Figure 2. Protocol for EPR-based Rabin QOT
Notice that while qot requires no quantum memory for honest players,
quantum memory for S seems to be required in epr-qot. The following
Lemma shows the strict equivalence between qot and epr-qot.
Lemma 3.2. qot is secure if and only if epr-qot is secure.
Proof: The proof follows easily after observing that S’s choices of r and
f , together with the measurements all commute with R’s actions. There-
fore, they can be performed right after Step 1 with no change for R’s view.
Modifying epr-qot that way results in qot. 
Note that for a dishonest receiver it is not only irrelevant whether he tries
to attack qot or epr-qot, but in fact there is no difference in the two
protocols from his point of view.
Lemma 3.3. epr-qot is perfectly receiver-private.
Proof: It is obvious that no information about whether R has received the
bit is leaked to any sender S˜, since R does not send anything, i.e. epr-qot
is non-interactive! 
3.3 Modeling Dishonest Receivers
We model dishonest receivers in qot respectively epr-qot under the as-
sumption that the maximum size of their quantum storage is bounded.
These adversaries are only required to have bounded quantum storage when
they reach Step 4 in (epr-)qot. Before that, the adversary can store and
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carry out quantum computations involving any number of qubits. Apart
from the restriction on the size of the quantum memory available to the
adversary, no other assumption is made. In particular, the adversary is not
assumed to be computationally bounded and the size of its classical memory
is not restricted.
Definition 3.4. The set Rγ denotes all possible quantum dishonest re-
ceivers {R˜n}n>0 in qot or epr-qot where for each n > 0, R˜n has quantum
memory of size at most γn when Step 4 is reached.
In general, the adversary R˜ is allowed to perform any quantum computation
compressing the n qubits received from S into a quantum register M of size
at most γn when Step 4 is reached. More precisely, the compression function
is implemented by some unitary transform C acting upon the quantum state
received and an ancilla of arbitrary size. The compression is performed by
a measurement that we assume in the computational basis without loss
of generality. Before starting Step 4, the adversary first applies a unitary
transform C:
2−n/2
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉 ⊗ C|x〉|0〉 7→ 2−n/2
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉 ⊗
∑
y
αx,y|ϕx,y〉M |y〉Y ,
where for all x,
∑
y |αx,y|2 = 1. Then, a measurement in the computational
basis is applied to register Y providing classical outcome y. The result is a
quantum state in register M of size γn qubits. Ignoring the value of y to
ease the notation, the re-normalized state of the system is now in its most
general form when Step 4 in epr-qot is reached:
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
αx|x〉 ⊗ |ϕx〉M ,
where
∑
x |αx|2 = 1.
3.4 Uncertainty Relation
We first prove a general uncertainty result and derive from that a corollary
that plays the crucial role in the security proof of epr-qot and thus of
qot. The uncertainty result concerns the situation where the sender holds
an arbitrary quantum register of n qubits. He may measure them in either
the + or the × basis. We are interested in the distribution of both these
measurement results, and we want to claim that they cannot both be “very
far from uniform”. One way to express this is to say that a distribution is
very non-uniform if one can identify a subset of outcomes that has much
higher probability than for a uniform choice. Intuitively, the theorem below
says that such sets cannot be found for both of the sender’s measurements.
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Theorem 3.5. Let the density matrix ρA describe the state of a n-qubit
register A. Let Q+(·) and Q×(·) be the respective distributions of the out-
come when register A is measured in the +-basis respectively the ×-basis.
Then, for any two sets L+ ⊂ {0, 1}n and L× ⊂ {0, 1}n it holds that
Q+(L+) +Q×(L×) ≤
(
1 +
√
2−n|L+||L×|
)2
.
Proof: We can purify register A by adding a register B, such that the
state of the composite system is pure. It can then be written as |ψ〉AB =∑
x∈{0,1}n αx|x〉A|ϕx〉B for some complex amplitudes αx and normalized
state vectors |ϕx〉.
Clearly, Q+(x) = |αx|2. To give a more explicit form of the distribution
Q×, we apply the Hadamard transformation to register A:
(H⊗n ⊗ 1B)|ψ〉 =
∑
z∈{0,1}n
|z〉 ⊗
∑
x∈{0,1}n
2−
n
2 (−1)x·zαx|ϕx〉
and obtain
Q×(z) =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈{0,1}n
2−
n
2 (−1)x·zαx|ϕx〉
∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
Let L
+
denote the complement of L+ and p its probability Q+(L
+
). We
can now split the sum in Q×(z) in the following way:
Q×(z) =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈{0,1}n
2−
n
2 (−1)x·zαx|ϕx〉
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣∣√p
∑
x∈L+
2−
n
2 (−1)x·z αx√
p
|ϕx〉+
∑
x∈L+
2−
n
2 (−1)x·zαx|ϕx〉
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣∣√p · ζz|υz〉+
∑
x∈L+
2−
n
2 (−1)x·zαx|ϕx〉
∣∣∣∣∣
2
where |υz〉 is defined as follows: For the normalized state |υ〉 :=
∑
x∈L+
αx√
p |x〉|ϕx〉,
ζz|υz〉 is the z-component of the state H⊗n|υ〉 =
∑
z ζz|z〉⊗|υz〉. It therefore
holds that
∑
z |ζz|2 = 1.
To upper-bound the amplitudes provided by the sum over L+, we notice
that the amplitude is maximized when all unit vectors |ϕx〉 point in the
same direction and when (−1)x·zαx = |αx|. More formally,∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈L+
2−
n
2 (−1)x·zαx|ϕx〉
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2−n2
∑
x∈L+
|αx|
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≤ 2−n2
√∣∣L+∣∣√∑
x∈L+
|αx|2 (3)
≤ 2−n2
√∣∣L+∣∣,
where (3) is obtained from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Using ℓ+ and ℓ×
as shorthands for
∣∣L+∣∣ respectively ∣∣L×∣∣, we conclude that
Q×(L×) =
∑
z∈L×
Q×(z)
≤
∑
z∈L×
(
|√p · ζz|υz〉|+ 2−
n
2
√
ℓ+
)2
≤ p
∑
z∈L×
|ζz|2 + 2 · 2−
n
2
√
ℓ+
∑
z∈L×
|ζz|+ ℓ× · 2−nℓ+
≤ p+ 2 · 2−n2
√
ℓ+
√
ℓ×
∑
z∈L×
|ζz|2 + 2−nℓ+ℓ× (4)
≤ p+ 2
√
2−nℓ+ℓ× + 2−nℓ+ℓ×
= 1−Q+(L+) + 2
√
2−nℓ+ℓ× + 2−nℓ+ℓ×. (5)
Inequality (4) follows again from Cauchy-Schwarz while in (5), we use the
definition of p. The claim of the proposition follows after re-arranging the
terms. 
This theorem yields a meaningful bound as long as |L+| · |L×| < (√2−
1)2 · 2n, e.g. if L+ and L× both contain less than 2n/2 elements. If for
r ∈ {+,×}, Lr contains only the n-bit string with the maximal probability
of Qr, we obtain as a corollary a slightly weaker version of a known relation
(see (9) in [19]).
Corollary 3.6. Let q+∞ and q×∞ be the maximal probabilities of the distri-
butions Q+ and Q× from above. It then holds that q+∞ · q×∞ ≤ 14(1 + c)4
where c = 2−n/2.
Theorem 3.5 can be generalized to more than two mutually unbiased
bases. We call different sets B0,B1, . . . ,BN of bases of the complex Hilbert
space C2
n
mutually unbiased, if for all i 6= j ∈ {0, . . . , N}, it holds that
∀|ϕ〉 ∈ Bi ∀|ψ〉 ∈ Bj : |〈ϕ|ψ〉|2 = 2−n.
Theorem 3.7. Let the density matrix ρA describe the state of a n-qubit
register A and let B0,B1, . . . ,BN be mutually unbiased bases of register
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A. Let Q0(·), Q1(·), . . . , QN (·) be the distributions of the outcome when
register A is measured in bases B0,B1, . . . ,BN , respectively. Then, for any
sets L0, L1, . . . , LN ⊂ {0, 1}n, it holds that
N∑
i=0
Qi(Li) ≤ 1−
(
N + 1
2
)
+
∑
0≤j<k≤N
(
1 +
√
2−n|Lj ||Lk|
)2
.
Proof: Like in the proof of Theorem 3.5, we can purify register A by
adding a register B. The composite state can then be written as |ψ〉AB =∑
x∈{0,1}n αx|x〉A|ϕx〉B for some complex amplitudes αx and normalized
state vectors |ϕx〉.
We prove the statement by induction over N : For N = 1, by applying an
appropriate unitary transform to the whole system, we can assume without
loss of generality that B0 is the standard +-basis.
Let us denote by T the matrix of the basis change from B0 to B1. As
the inner product between states |φ〉 ∈ B0 and |φ′〉 ∈ B1 is always |〈φ|φ′〉| =
2−n/2, it follows that all entries of T are complex numbers of the form
2−n/2 · eiλ for real λ ∈ R.
It is easy to verify that the same proof as for Theorem 3.5 applies after
replacing the Hadamard transform H⊗n on the sender’s part by T and using
the above observation about the entries of T .
For the induction step from N to N + 1, we define p := Q0(L
0
), |υ〉 :=∑
x∈L0
αx√
p |x〉|ϕx〉, and let ζjz |υjz〉 be the z-component of the state |υ〉 trans-
formed into basis Bj. As in the proof of Theorem 3.5, using ℓi as a short
hand for
∣∣Li∣∣, it follows:
N∑
i=1
Qi(Li) =
N∑
i=1
∑
z∈Li
Qi(z)
≤
N∑
i=1
∑
z∈Li
(√
p
∣∣ζ iz∣∣υiz〉∣∣+ 2−n/2√ℓ0)2
≤ p ·
N∑
i=1
∑
z∈Li
|ζ iz|2 +
N∑
i=1
(
2 ·
√
2−nℓ0ℓi + 2−nℓ0ℓi
)
≤ p ·
N∑
i=1
P i(Li) +
N∑
i=1
(
1−
√
2−nℓ0ℓi
)2 −N
where the distributions P i are obtained by measuring register A of the nor-
malized state |υ〉 in the mutually unbiased bases B1,B2, . . . ,BN . We apply
the induction hypothesis to the sum of P i(Li):
N∑
i=1
Qi(Li) ≤ p ·
N∑
i=1
P i(Li) +
N∑
i=1
(
1 +
√
2−nℓ0ℓi
)2
−N
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≤ [1−Q0(L0)] [ ∑
1≤j<k≤N
(
1 +
√
2−nℓjℓk
)2
+ 1−
(
N
2
)]
+
N∑
i=1
(
1−
√
2−nℓ0ℓi
)2 −N
≤ −Q0(L0) + 1−
(
N + 1
2
)
+
∑
0≤j<k≤N
(
1 +
√
2−nℓjℓk
)2
where the last inequality follows by observing that the term in the right
bracket is at least 1 and rearranging the terms. This completes the induction
step and the proof of the proposition. 
Analogous to Corollary 3.6, we derive an uncertainty relation about the
sum of the min-entropies of up to 2
n
4 distributions.
Corollary 3.8. For an ε > 0, let 0 < N < 2(
1
4
−ε)n. For i = 0, . . . , N , let
H i∞ be the min-entropies of the distributions Qi from the theorem above.
Then,
N∑
i=0
H i∞ ≥ (N + 1)
(
log(N + 1)− negl(n)).
Proof: For i = 0, . . . , N , we denote by qi∞ the maximal probability of Qi
and let Li be the set containing only the n-bit string x with this maximal
probability qi∞. Theorem 3.7 together with the assumption about N assures∑N
i=0 q
i∞ ≤ 1 + negl(n). By the inequality of the geometric and arithmetic
mean follows:
N∑
i=0
H i∞ = − log
N∏
i=0
qi∞ ≥ − log
(
1 + negl(n)
N + 1
)N+1
= (N + 1)
(
log(N + 1)− negl(n)).

3.5 Security Against Dishonest Receivers
In this section, we show that epr-qot is secure against any dishonest re-
ceiver having access to a quantum storage device of size strictly smaller than
half the number of qubits received at Step 2.
In our setting, we use Theorem 3.5 to lower-bound the overall probability
of strings with small probabilities in the following sense. For 0 ≤ γ +κ ≤ 1,
define
S+ :=
{
x ∈ {0, 1}n : Q+(x) ≤ 2−(γ+κ)n} and
S× :=
{
z ∈ {0, 1}n : Q×(z) ≤ 2−(γ+κ)n}
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to be the sets of strings with small probabilities and denote by L+ := S
+
and L× := S× their complements. (Here’s the mnemonic: S for the strings
with Small probabilities, L for Large.) Note that for all x ∈ L+, we have
that Q+(x) > 2−(γ+κ)n and therefore |L+| < 2(γ+κ)n. Analogously, we have
|L×| < 2(γ+κ)n. For the ease of notation, we abbreviate the probabilities that
strings with small probabilities occur as follows: q+ := Q+(S+) and q× :=
Q×(S×). The next corollary now immediately follows from Theorem 3.5.
Corollary 3.9. Let γ + κ < 12 . For the probability distributions Q
+, Q×
and the sets S+, S× defined above, we have
q+ + q× = Q+(S+) +Q×(S×) ≥ 1− negl(n).
Theorem 3.10. For all γ < 12 , qot is secure against Rγ .
Proof: After Lemmata 3.2 and 3.3, it remains to show that epr-qot is
sender-private against Rγ . Since γ <
1
2 , we can find κ > 0 with γ + κ <
1
2 .
Consider a dishonest receiver in epr-qot R˜with quantummemory of size γn.
Using the notation from Section 3.1, we show that there exists an event
E such that P [E ] ≥ 12 − negl(n) as well as δ([{B}⊗ρR˜|E ], [{B}]⊗[ρR˜|E ]) ≤
negl(n), as required by the sender-privacy condition of Definition 3.1. Let X
denote the random variable describing the outcome x of S’s measurement (in
basis r) in Step 4 of epr-qot. We implicitly understand the distribution
of X to be conditioned on the classical outcome y of the measurement R˜
performs when the memory bound applies, as described in Section 3.3. We
define E to be the event X ∈ Sr. Note that E is independent of B and
thus [B|E ] = [B]. Furthermore, due to the uniform choice of r, and using
Corollary 3.9, P [E ] = 12 (q+ + q×) ≥ 12 − negl(n).
In order to show the second condition, we have to show that whenever E
occurs, the dishonest receiver cannot distinguish the situation where B = 0
is sent from the one where B = 1 is sent. As the bit B is masked by the
output of the hash function F (X) in Step 4 of epr-qot (where the random
variable F represents the random choice for f), this is equivalent to distin-
guish between F (X) = 0 and F (X) = 1. This situation is exactly suited for
applying Theorem 2.1, which says that F (X) = 0 is indistinguishable from
F (X) = 1 whenever the right-hand side of (2) is negligible.
In the case r = +, we have
H∞(X|X ∈ S+) = − log
(
max
x∈S+
Q+(x)
q+
)
≥ − log
(
2−(γ+κ)n
q+
)
= γn+ κn+ log(q+). (6)
If q+ ≥ 2−κ2n then H∞(X|X ∈ S+) ≥ γn + κ2n and indeed the right-
hand side of (2) decreases exponentially when conditioning on X ∈ S+. The
corresponding holds for the case r = ×.
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Finally, if q+ < 2−
κ
2
n (or similarly q× < 2−
κ
2
n) then instead of as above
we define E as the empty event if r = + and as the event X ∈ S× if
r = ×. It follows that P [E ] = 12 · q× ≥ 12 − negl(n) as well as H∞(X|E) =
H∞(X|X ∈ S×) ≥ γn+ κn+ log(q×) ≥ γn+ κ2n (for n large enough), both
by Corollary 3.9 and the bound on q+. 
3.6 On the Necessity of Privacy Amplification
In this section, we show that randomized privacy amplification seems to be
needed for protocol qot to be secure. It is tempting to believe that the
sender could use the xor
⊕
i xi in order to mask the bit b, rather than f(x)
for a randomly sampled f ∈ Hn. This would reduce the communication
complexity as well as the number of random coins needed. However, we
argue in this section that this is not secure (against an adversary as we
model it). Indeed, somewhat surprisingly, this variant can be broken by
a dishonest receiver that has no quantum memory at all (but that can do
coherent measurements on pairs of qubits).
Clearly, a dishonest receiver can break the modified scheme qot and
learn the bit b with probability 1 if he can compute
⊕
i xi with probability 1.
Note that, using the equivalence between qot and epr-qot, xi can be
understood as the outcome of the measurement in either the +- or the ×-
basis, performed by the sender on one part of an EPR pair while the other
has been handed over to the receiver. The following proposition shows that
indeed the receiver can learn
⊕
i xi by a suitable measurement of his parts
of the EPR pairs. Concretely, he measures the qubits he receives pair-wise
by a suitable measurement which allows him to learn the xor of the two
corresponding xi’s, no matter what the basis is (and he needs to store one
single qubit in case n is odd). This obviously allows him to learn the xor of
all xi’s in all cases.
Proposition 3.11. Consider two EPR pairs, i.e., |ψ〉 = 12
∑
x |x〉S|x〉R
where x ranges over {0, 1}2. Let r ∈ {+,×}, and let x1 and x2 be the
result when measuring the two qubits in register S in basis r. There exists
a fixed measurement for register R so that the outcome together with r
uniquely determines x1 ⊕ x2.
Proof: The measurement that does the job is the Bell measurement, i.e.,
the measurement in the Bell basis {|Φ+〉, |Ψ+〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ−〉}. Recall,
∣∣Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ + |11〉+) = 1√
2
(|00〉× + |11〉×)∣∣Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ + |10〉+) = 1√
2
(|00〉× − |11〉×)∣∣Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ − |11〉+) = 1√
2
(|01〉× + |10〉×)
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∣∣Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ − |10〉+) = 1√2
(|10〉× − |01〉×) .
Due to the special form of the Bell basis, when register R is measured
and, as a consequence, one of the four Bell states is observed, the state in
register S collapses to that same Bell state. Indeed, when doing the basis
transformation, all cross-products cancel each other out. It now follows by
inspection that knowledge of the Bell state and the basis r allows to predict
the xor of the two bits observed when measuring the Bell state in basis r.
For instance, for the Bell state |Ψ+〉, the xor is 1 if r = + and it is 0 if
r = ×. 
Note that from the above proof one can see that the receiver’s attack,
respectively his measurement on each pair of qubits, can be understood as
teleporting one of the two (entangled) qubits from the receiver to the sender
using the other as EPR pair (but the receiver does not send the outcome of
his measurement to the sender, but keeps it in order to predict the xor).
Clearly, the same strategy also works against any fixed linear function.
Therefore, the only hope for doing deterministic privacy amplification is by
using a non-linear function; but whether it is possible at all is not known to
us.
3.7 Weakening the Assumptions
Observe that qot requires error-free quantum communication, in that a
transmitted bit b, that is encoded by the sender and measured by the re-
ceiver using the same basis, is always received as b. And it requires a perfect
quantum source which on request produces one qubit in the right state, e.g.
one photon with the right polarization. Indeed, in case of noisy quantum
communication, an honest receiver in qot is likely to receive an incorrect
bit, and the sender-privacy of qot is vulnerable to imperfect sources that
once in while transmit more than one qubit in the same state: a malicious
receiver R˜ can easily determine the basis r ∈ {+,×} and measure all the
following qubits in the right basis. However, current technology only al-
lows to approximate the behavior of single-photon sources and of noise-free
quantum communication. It would be preferable to find a variant of qot
that allows to weaken the technological requirements put upon the honest
parties.
In this section, we present such a protocol based on BB84 states [1],
bb84-qot (see Figure 3). The security proof follows essentially by adapting
the security analysis of qot in a rather straightforward way, as will be
discussed later.
Let us consider a quantum channel with an error probability φ < 12 , i.e.,
φ denotes the probability that a transmitted bit b, that is encoded by the
sender and measured by the receiver using the same basis, is received as
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1− b. In order not to have the security rely on any level of noise, we assume
the error probability to be zero when considering a dishonest receiver. Also,
let us consider a quantum source which produces two or more qubits (in the
same state), rather than just one, with probability η < 1 − φ. We call this
the (φ, η)-weak quantum model.
In order to deal with noisy quantum communication, we need to do error-
correction without giving the adversary too much information. Techniques
to solve this problem are known as information reconciliation (e.g. [2]) or
as secure sketches [13]. Let x ∈ {0, 1}ℓ be an arbitrary string, and let
x′ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ be the result of flipping every bit in x (independently) with
probability φ. It is well known that learning the syndrome S(x) of x, with
respect to an efficiently decodable linear error-correcting code C of length ℓ
with minimal distance d = (φ + ε)ℓ where ε > 0, allows to recover x from
x′, except with negligible probability in ℓ (e.g. [20, 5, 13]). Furthermore, it
is known from coding theory that (for large enough ℓ) such a code can be
chosen with rate R arbitrary close to (but smaller than) 1− h(φ), i.e., such
that the syndrome length s is bounded by s < (h(φ) + ε)ℓ where ε > 0 (see
e.g. [5] and the reference therein).
Regarding the loss of information, we can analyze privacy amplification
in a similar way as before, just by adding the syndrome S(x) to the random
state ρ. Using that S0([{S(X)}⊗ρ]) ≤ q + s, Theorem 2.1 then reads as
d(F (X) |{F}⊗{S(X)}⊗ρ) ≤ 1
2
2−
1
2
(H∞(X)−q−s−1). (7)
Consider the protocol bb84-qot in the (φ, η)-weak quantummodel shown
in Figure 3. The protocol uses a efficiently decodable linear code Cℓ, param-
eterized in ℓ ∈ N, with codeword length ℓ, minimal distance d = (φ + ε)ℓ,
and rate R = 1−h(φ)−ε for some small ε > 0. Let Sℓ be the corresponding
syndrome function. Like before, the memory bound in bb84-qot applies
before Step 4.
By the above mentioned properties of the code Cℓ, it is obvious that R
receives the correct bit b if r′ = r, except with negligible probability. (The
error probability is negligible in ℓ, but by Bernstein’s law of large numbers,
ℓ is linear in n except with negligible probability.) Also, since there is no
communication from R to S, bb84-qot is clearly receiver-private. Similar
as for protocol qot, in order to argue about sender-privacy we compare
bb84-qot with a purified version shown in Figure 4. bb84-epr-qot runs
in the (φ, 0)-weak quantum model, and the imperfectness of the quantum
source assumed in bb84-qot is simulated by S in bb84-epr-qot so that
there is no difference from R’s point of view.
The security equivalence between bb84-qot (in the (φ, η)-weak quantum
model) and bb84-epr-qot (in the (φ, 0)-weak quantum model) is omitted
here as it follows essentially along the same lines as in Section 3.2.
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bb84-qot(b):
1. S picks x ∈R {0, 1}n and θ ∈R {+,×}n.
2. S sends xi in the corresponding bases |x1〉θ1 , . . . , |xn〉θn to R.
3. R picks r′ ∈R {+,×} and measures all qubits in basis r′. Let
x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
4. S picks r ∈R {+,×}, sets I := {i : θi = {+,×}[r]} and ℓ := |I|,
and announces r, I, syn := Sℓ(x|I), f ∈R Hℓ, and e := b⊕ f(x|I).
5. R recovers x|I from x′|I and syn, and outputs a := 1 and b′ :=
e⊕ f(x|I) if r′ = r and else a := 0 and b′ := 0.
Figure 3. Protocol for the BB84 version of Rabin QOT
Theorem 3.12. In the (φ, η)-weak quantum model, bb84-qot is secure
against Rγ for any γ <
1−η
4 − h(φ)2 (if parameter ε is chosen small enough).
Proof Sketch: It remains to show that bb84-epr-qot is sender-private
against Bγ (in the (φ, 0)-weak quantum model). The reasoning goes exactly
along the lines of the proof of Theorem 3.10, except that we restrict our
attention to those i’s which are in J . By Bernstein’s law of large numbers,
ℓ lies within (1± ε)n/2 and |J | within (1− η± ε)n/2 except with negligible
probability. In order to make the proof easier to read, we assume that
ℓ = n/2 and |J | = (1− η)n/2, and we also treat the ε occurring in the rate
of the code Cℓ as zero. For the full proof, we simply need to carry the ε’s
along, and then choose it small enough at the end of the proof.
Write n′ = |J | = (1 − η)n/2, and let γ′ be such that γn = γ′n′, i.e.,
γ′ = 2γ/(1 − η). Let S+ and S× be defined as in Section 3.5, but with
respect to n′ and γ′ (and some κ < 12 − γ′). It then follows as in the proof
of Theorem 3.10 that
H∞
(
X|J
∣∣X|J ∈ S+) ≥ γ′n′ + κn′ + log(q+)
= γn+ κ(1− η)n/2 + log(q+).
Similar as in the proof of Theorem 3.10, one can make a case distinction
on q+ (whether q+ ≥ 2−εn or q+ < 2−εn), and in both cases argue that
the min-entropy in question is larger than γn+ κ(1− η)n/2 (± some εn’s).
By (2), it remains to argue that this is larger than q + s = γn + h(φ)n/2,
i.e.,
κ(1− η) > h(φ) ,
where κ has to satisfy
κ <
1
2
− γ′ = 1
2
− 2γ/(1 − η) .
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bb84-epr-qot(b):
1. S prepares n EPR pairs each in state |Ω〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉). Ad-
ditionally, S initializes I ′+ := ∅ and I ′× := ∅.
2. For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, S does the following. With probability
1 − η S sends one half of the i-th pair to R and keeps the other
half. While with probability η S picks θi ∈R {+,×}, replaces I ′θi
by I ′θi ∪ {i} and sends two or more qubits in the same state |xi〉θi
to R where xi ∈R {0, 1}.
3. R picks r′ ∈R {+,×} and measures all received qubits in basis r′.
Let x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
4. S picks a random index set J ⊂R {1, . . . , n} \ (I ′+ ∪ I ′×). Then,
it picks r ∈R {+,×}, sets I := J ∪ I ′r and ℓ := |I|, and for each
i ∈ J it measures the corresponding qubit in basis r. Let xi be
the corresponding outcome, and let x|I be the collection of all
xi’s with i ∈ I. S announces r, I, syn = Sℓ(x|I), f ∈R Hℓ, and
e = b⊕ f(x|I).
5. R recovers x|I from x′|I and syn, and outputs a := 1 and b′ :=
e⊕ f(x|I), if r′ = r and else a := 0 and b′ := 0.
Figure 4. Protocol for EPR-based Rabin QOT, BB84 version
This can obviously be achieved (by choosing κ appropriately) if and only if
the claimed bound on γ holds. 
4 Quantum Commitment Scheme
In this section, we present a BC scheme from a committer C with bounded
quantum memory to an unbounded receiver V. The scheme is peculiar since
in order to commit to a bit, the committer does not send anything. During
the committing stage information only goes from V to C. The security
analysis of the scheme uses similar techniques as the analysis of epr-qot.
4.1 The Protocol
The objective of this section is to present a bounded quantum-memory BC
scheme comm (see Figure 5). Intuitively, a commitment to a bit b is made
by measuring random BB84-states in basis {+,×}[b].
As for the OT-protocol of Section 3.2, we present an equivalent EPR-
version of the protocol that is easier to analyze (see Figure 6).
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comm(b):
1. V picks x ∈R {0, 1}n and r ∈R {+,×}n.
2. V sends xi in the corresponding bases |x1〉r1 , |x2〉r2 , . . . , |xn〉rn
to C.
3. C commits to the bit b by measuring all qubits in basis {+,×}[b].
Let x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
4. To open the commitment, C sends b and x′ to V.
5. V verifies that xi = x
′
i for those i where ri = {+,×}[b]. V accepts
if and only if this is the case.
Figure 5. Protocol for quantum commitment
Lemma 4.1. comm is secure if and only if epr-comm is secure.
Proof: The proof uses similar reasoning as the one for Lemma 3.2. First,
it clearly makes no difference, if we change Step 5 to the following:
5’. V chooses the subset I, measures all qubits with index in I in basis
{+,×}[b] and all qubits not in I in basis {+,×}[1−b]. V verifies that
xi = x
′
i for all i ∈ I and accepts if and only if this is the case.
Finally, we can observe that the view of C does not change if V would have
done his choice of I and his measurement already in Step 1. Doing the
measurements at this point means that the qubits to be sent to C collapse
to a state that is distributed identically to the state prepared in the original
scheme. The EPR-version is therefore equivalent to the original commitment
scheme from C’s point of view. 
It is clear that epr-comm is hiding, i.e., that the commit phase reveals
no information on the committed bit, since no information is transmitted to
V at all. Hence we have
Lemma 4.2. epr-comm is perfectly hiding.
4.2 Modeling Dishonest Committers
A dishonest committer C˜ with bounded memory of at most γn qubits in
epr-comm can be modeled very similarly to the dishonest OT-receiver R˜
from Section 3.3: C˜ consists first of a circuit acting on all n qubits received,
then of a measurement of all but at most γn qubits, and finally of a circuit
that takes the following input: a bit b that C˜ will attempt to open, the γn
qubits in memory, and some ancilla in a fixed state. The output is a string
x′ ∈ {0, 1}n to be sent to V at the opening stage.
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epr-comm(b):
1. V prepares n EPR pairs each in state |Ω〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉).
2. V sends one half of each pair to C and keeps the other halves.
3. C commits to the bit b by measuring all received qubits in basis
{+,×}[b]. Let x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
4. To open the commitment, C sends b and x′ to V.
5. V measures all his qubits in basis {+,×}[b] and obtains x ∈
{0, 1}n. He chooses a random subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. V veri-
fies that xi = x
′
i for all i ∈ I and accepts if and only if this is the
case.
Figure 6. Protocol for EPR-based quantum commitment
Definition 4.3. We define Cγ to be the class of all committers {C˜n}n>0 in
comm or epr-comm that, at the start of the opening phase (i.e. at Step 4),
have a quantum memory of size at most γn qubits.
We adopt the binding condition for quantum BC from [14]:
Definition 4.4. A (quantum) BC scheme is (statistically) binding against
C if for all {C˜n}n>0 ∈ C, the probability pb(n) that C˜n opens b ∈ {0, 1} with
success satisfies
p0(n) + p1(n) ≤ 1 + negl(n).
In the next section, we show that epr-comm is binding against Cγ for any
γ < 12 .
Note that the binding condition given here in Definition 4.4 is weaker
than the classical one, where one would require that a bit b exists such that
pb(n) is negligible. In the context of quantum bit commitment, this weaker
definition is typically justified by the argument that this is the best that
can be achieved for a general quantum adversary who can always commit
to 0 and 1 in superposition. However, an adversary with bounded quantum
storage cannot necessarily maintain a commitment in superposition since
the memory compression may force a collapse. Indeed, in upcoming work,
we show that commitment schemes exist satisfying the stronger binding
condition in the bounded quantum-storage model [9]. While the weaker
condition is sufficient for many applications, the stronger one seems to be
necessary in some cases (see the conclusion).
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4.3 Security Proof of the Commitment Scheme
Note that the first three steps of epr-qot and epr-comm (i.e. before the
memory bound applies) are exactly the same! This allows us to reuse Corol-
lary 3.9 and the analysis of Section 3.5 to prove the binding property of
epr-comm.
Theorem 4.5. For any γ < 12 , comm is perfectly hiding and statistically
binding against Cγ .
The proof is given below. It boils down to showing that essentially p0(n) ≤
1− q+ and p1(n) ≤ 1− q×. The binding property then follows immediately
from Corollary 3.9. The intuition behind p0(n) ≤ 1 − q+ = 1 − Q+(S+) is
that a committer has only a fair chance in opening to 0 if x measured in +
basis has a large probability, i.e., x 6∈ S+. The following proof makes this
intuition precise by choosing the ε and δ’s correctly.
Proof: It remains to show that epr-comm is binding against Cγ . Let κ > 0
be such that γ + κ < 12 . For the parameters κ and γ considered here, define
Q+, S+ and q+ as well as Q×, S× and q× as in Section 3.5. Furthermore, let
0 < δ < 12 be such that h(δ) < κ/2, where h is the binary entropy function,
and choose ε > 0 small enough such that h(δ) < (κ− ε)/2. This guarantees
that Bδn ≤ 2(κ−ε)n/2 for all (sufficiently large) n. For every n we distinguish
between the following two cases. If q+ ≥ 2−εn/2 then
H∞(X|X ∈ S+) ≥ γn+ κn+ log(q+) ≥ γn+
(
κ− ε
2
)
n
where the first inequality is argued as in (6). Applying Lemma 2.2, it follows
that any guess Xˆ for X satisfies
Pr
[
Xˆ ∈ Bδn(X) |X ∈ S+] ≤ 2− 12 (H∞(X|X∈S+)−γn−1)+log(Bδn) ≤ 2− ε4n+ 12 .
However, if Xˆ 6∈ Bδn(X) then sampling a random subset of the positions
will detect an error except with probability not bigger than 2−δn. Hence,
p0(n) = (1− q+) · p0|X 6∈S+ + q+ · p0|X∈S+
≤ 1− q+ + q+ · (2−δn(1− 2− ε4n+ 12 ) + 2− ε4n+ 12 ).
If on the other hand q+ < 2−εn/2 then trivially
p0(n) ≤ 1 = 1− q+ + q+ < 1− q+ + 2−εn/2.
In any case we have p0(n) ≤ 1− q+ + negl(n).
Analogously, we derive p1(n) ≤ 1− q× + negl(n) and conclude that
p0(n) + p1(n) ≤ 2− q+ − q× + negl(n) ≤ 1 + negl(n), (8)
where (8) is obtained from Corollary 3.9. 
24
4.4 Weakening the Assumptions
As argued earlier, assuming that a party can produce single qubits (with
probability 1) is not reasonable given current technology. Also the assump-
tion that there is no noise on the quantum channel is impractical. It can be
shown that a straightforward modification of comm remains secure in the
(φ, η)-weak quantum model as introduced in Section 3.7, with φ < 12 and
η < 1− φ.
Let comm’ be the modification of comm where in Step 5 V accepts if
and only if xi = x
′
i for all but about a φ-fraction of the i where ri = {+,×}[b].
More precisely, for all but a (φ+ε)-fraction, where ε > 0 is sufficiently small.
Theorem 4.6. In the (φ, η)-weak quantum model, comm’ is perfectly hid-
ing and it is binding against Cγ for any γ satisfying γ <
1
2 (1− η)− 2h(φ).
Proof Sketch: Using Bernstein’s law of large numbers, one can argue that
for honest C and V, the opening of a commitment is accepted except with
negligible probability. The hiding property holds using the same reasoning
as in Lemma 4.2. And the binding property can be argued essentially along
the lines of Theorem 4.5, with the following modifications. Let J denote the
set of indices i where V succeeds in sending a single qubit. We restrict the
analysis to those i’s which are in J . By Bernstein’s law of large numbers, the
cardinality of J is about (1−η)n (meaning within (1−η±ε)n), except with
negligible probability. Thus, restricting to these i’s has the same effect as
replacing γ by γ/(1−η) (neglecting the ±ε to simplify notation). Assuming
that C˜ knows every xi for i 6∈ J , for all xi’s with i ∈ J he has to be able to
guess all but about a φ/(1 − η)-fraction correctly, in order to be successful
in the opening. However, C˜ succeeds with only negligible probability if
φ/(1 − η) < δ .
Additionally, δ must be such that
h(δ) <
κ
2
with
γ
1− η + κ <
1
2
.
Both restrictions on δ hold (respectively can be achieved by choosing κ
appropriately) if
2h
(
φ
1− η
)
+
γ
1− η <
1
2
.
Using the fact that h(νp) ≤ νh(p) for any ν ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ p ≤ 12 such that
νp ≤ 1, this is clearly satisfied if 2h(φ) + γ < 12(1 − η). This proves the
claim. 
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5 Generalizing the Memory Model
The bounded quantum-storage model limits the number of physical qubits
the adversary’s memory can contain. A more realistic model would rather
address the noise process the adversary’s memory undergoes. For instance,
it is not hard to build a very large, but unreliable memory device containing
a large number of qubits. It is reasonable to expect that our protocols
remain secure also in a scenario where the adversary’s memory is of arbitrary
size, but where some quantum operation (modeling noise) is applied to it.
Inequality (1) of the Privacy Amplification Theorem 2.1 allows us to apply
our constructions to slightly more general memory models. In particular, all
our protocols that are secure against adversaries with memory of no more
than γn qubits are also secure against any noise model that reduces the rank
of the mixed state [ρ], held by the adversary, to at most 2γn.
An example of a noise process resulting in a reduction of S0([ρ]) is an
erasure channel. Assuming the n initial qubits are each erased with prob-
ability larger than 1 − γ when the memory bound applies, it holds except
with negligible probability in n that S0([ρ]) < γn. The same applies if the
noise process is modelled by a depolarizing channel with error probability
p = 1−γ. Such a depolarizing channel replaces each qubit by a random one
with probability p and does nothing with probability 1− p.
The technique we have developped does not allow to deal with depo-
larizing channels with p < 1 − γ although one would expect that some
0 < p < 1−γ should be sufficient to ensure privacy against such adversaries.
The reason being that not knowing the positions where the errors occured
should make it more difficult for the adversary than when the noise process
is modelled by an erasure channel. However, it seems that our uncertainty
relations (i.e. Theorems 3.5 and 3.7) are not strong enough to address this
case. Generalizing the bounded quantum-storage model to more realistic
noisy-memory models is an interesting open question.
6 Conclusion And Further Research
We have shown how to construct ROT and BC securely in the bounded
quantum-storage model. Our protocols require no quantum memory for
honest players and remain secure provided the adversary has only access to
quantum memory of size bounded by a large fraction of all qubits transmit-
ted. Such a gap between the amount of storage required for honest players
and adversaries is not achievable by classical means. All our protocols are
non-interactive and can be implemented using current technology.
In this paper, we only considered ROT of one bit per invocation. Our
technique can easily be extended to deal with string ROT, essentially by
using a class of two-universal functions with range {0, 1}ℓn rather than {0, 1},
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for some ℓ with γ + ℓ < 12 (respectively <
1−η
4 − h(φ)2 for bb84-qot).
Although other flavors of OTs can be constructed from ROT using stan-
dard reductions, a more direct approach would give a better ratio between
storage-bound and communication-complexity. More general security def-
initions allowing for better composition (such as universal composability)
briefly discussed at the end of Section 3.1 also disserve to be studied. Re-
cent extensions have shown that a 1-2 OT protocol built along the lines of
bb84-qot is secure against adversaries with bounded quantum memory [9].
Interestingly, the techniques used are quite different from the ones of this
paper (which appear to fail in case of 1-2 OT), and they additionally allow
to analyse and prove secure the bit commitment scheme comm with respect
to the stronger security definition, as discussed in Section 4.2.
comm can easily be transformed into a string commitment scheme simply
by committing bitwise, at the cost of a corresponding blow-up of the com-
munication complexity. In order to prove this string commitment secure,
though, it is necessary that comm is secure with respect to the stronger
security definition.
How to construct and in particular prove secure a more efficient string
commitment scheme is still an open problem. Furthermore, it is still un-
solved how to construct and prove secure a 1-m OT protocol, more efficient
than via the general reduction.
Finally, finding protocols secure against adversaries in more general
noisy-memory models, quickly discussed in Section 5, would certainly be
a natural extension of this work to more practical settings.
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